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Can the market be tamed? A thought experiment on 1 
the value(s) of planning 2 
Abstract 3 
In many contexts across the globe the scope and remit of planning is being limited.  Much of the 4 
academic literature identifies this tendency as arising from a tension between planning as a state-5 
regulatory activity and the tenets of neoliberalism – particularly free market competition.  In this 6 
essay we seek to explore the degree to which this perceived incompatibility between planning 7 
and the neoliberal order is genuinely real by running a thought experiment.  We hope to show 8 
that thinking about the development process in this way points to alternative ways of imagining 9 
the scope and remit of planning – and how the normative principles at the core of the activity 10 
might be reconciled, or even extended, within the context of a neoliberal polity.  11 
 12 
Introduction  13 
In many contexts across the globe the scope and remit of urban and environmental planning is 14 
being limited (Gunder, 2016; Gunn and Hillier, 2012; Hrelja, 2011; Holman, Mossa and Pani, 15 
2017; Mäntysalo and Saglie, 2010; MacCullum and Hopkins, 2011).  As an activity that has 16 
statutory regulation at its core it often grates against the now more or less fixed neoliberal 17 
orthodoxy that posits the market as locomotive of progress against bureaucracy as a brake on 18 
development (Brenner and Theodore, 2005; Fisher and Gilbert, 2013; Jones, 2012).  Although 19 
the specific anatomy of the neoliberal order varies from nation to nation some core similarities 20 
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have been catalogued and planning’s corresponding incompatibility with these principles 21 
identified (for example, Lovering, 2009). 22 
For some academics interested in making the case in favor of planning, corresponding attempts 23 
to diminish the professional activity to make way for the market have been understood as an 24 
‘attack’ (Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2014).  Others have highlighted the continuing public interest 25 
justification that spawned planning in the first place (Campbell, 2012).  In some cases (Campbell 26 
and Fainstein, 2012) the defence of planning, quite correctly, points out that the environment 27 
(widely construed) is a very complex asset that is not well captured by those analyses of planning 28 
that categorise it as a restrictive drag on economic growth (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2005; Nathan 29 
and Overman, 2011). This point has been extended by research that has sought to investigate 30 
much more fully planning’s specific ‘added value’ (Adams and Watkins, 2014; Adams and 31 
Tiesdell, 2010).  The net result of work in this vein has been to challenge the logic that real estate 32 
markets would respond effectively to market signals if it was not for the planning system.  33 
Correspondingly, the argument has emerged that there may be value in thinking of planning as a 34 
‘market maker’ (Lord and O’Brien, 2017) and that planning may be conceived as an important 35 
foil to the neoliberal hegemony rather than explicitly incompatible with it.   36 
But what would this type of planning look like?  Could we imagine ways in which a modernised 37 
planning might combine these ‘market making’ aspects with its normative ends and professional 38 
ethics: the public interest, social inclusion, environmental sustainability, balanced development?   39 
An important strain in the literature would suggest not.  A sustained body of work has emerged 40 
on the incompatibility of planning’s social and environmental goals with the core attributes of 41 
neoliberal capitalism.  The result is that an earlier proposed ‘sustainability fix’ (While, Jonas and 42 
Gibbs, 2004) has, following thoroughgoing empirical investigation, given way to scepticism that 43 
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a balance can be struck (Bina, 2013; Georgeson, Caprotti and Bailey, 2014; Gibbs and O’Neil, 44 
2014; Krueger and Gibbs, 2007; O’Neil and Gibbs, 2016).  For an area of public policy which is 45 
charged with precisely this task of taming the market, this question is particularly germane to 46 
planning.  Although rarely confronted explicitly in the planning literature some, such as 47 
Campbell, Tait and Watkins’ (2014), have posed the question directly: “Is there space for better 48 
planning in a neoliberal world?” (see also, Legacy, Lowe and Cole-Hawthorne, 2016).  At one 49 
remove Holman, Mossa and Pani’s (2017) work has made a significant contribution through an 50 
exploration of the empirics of this question by looking at planning reform in England to explore 51 
the points of convergence and divergence between planning’s economic and ethical value(s). 52 
In this paper we hope to further this debate by exploring from first principles the relationship 53 
between how planning systems function at a human level and the outcomes they might entail.  In 54 
this respect our aim is to advance the literature on planning’s capacity to effect meaningful 55 
change in business decision making by exploring the intersection of “how real estate developers 56 
think” (Brown, 2015) and how they might act and, correspondingly, any influence planning 57 
might have in this regard.  In this respect our contribution is to the nascent work that seeks to 58 
develop a ‘behavioral insights’ take on planning (Bond et al., 2016; Ferrari et al., 2011; Jackson 59 
and Watkins, 2008; Lord, 2009, 2012).   60 
 61 
The development process: rationality, belief and human behviour 62 
There is now a huge corpus of research on the development process, much of it inspired by 63 
various branches of economics.  Perhaps the best example of this crossover comes in the shape 64 
of transaction cost approaches that seek to understand the development process through the 65 
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lens provided by the New Institutional Economics (Alexander, 1992, 2001; Lai, Ngar Ng and 66 
Yung, 2008; Webster, 2005).  For adherents this framework provides a persuasive way of reading 67 
off outcomes from the governance arrangements and the interaction of the prevailing set of 68 
institutions (widely construed to include formal codes and informal norms of practice) that exist 69 
in a particular context.  However, its post-hoc vantage point and the primacy accorded to the rules 70 
and institutional players of the game - as opposed to the interpretation of those rules that result in 71 
the human behaviors of those who people the institutions (or act individually) – have meant that 72 
not all are convinced.  Fischer’s (1977:322) early unease remains relevant: “Transaction costs 73 
have a well-deserved bad name as a theoretical device, because solutions to problems involving 74 
transaction costs are often sensitive to the assumed form of the costs, and because there is a 75 
suspicion that almost anything can be rationalized by invoking suitably specified transaction 76 
costs.”  77 
In response some researchers have turned to game theory.  Perhaps the fundamental motivating 78 
factor encouraging the infusion of this school of economic thought into planning research is the 79 
recognition that the markets that planning regulates are really quite peculiar.  The development 80 
process, irrespective of contextual setting, is overlaid with specific qualitative features that speak 81 
very closely to the questions with which game theory (and behavioral economics) deal: the 82 
decision making process pits hypothetical development against unpriced public goods, usually 83 
environmental assets; buyers and sellers may take a very long time to negotiate a mutually 84 
agreeable settlement; the decision to develop is (almost always) irreversible and creates landscape 85 
altering externalities that cast a decades-long shadow; and the issue of local democratic control is 86 
a relevant consideration in many settings.  These observations alone point to the limitations of 87 
econometric estimations of planning’s costs devoid of any corrective for the effect the activity 88 
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has on the quality of market conditions or the things it achieves that lie outside the parameters of 89 
any given model. 90 
In those cases where game theory has been applied to planning-orientated questions the focus 91 
has usually been on the specific microeconomics of urban transformation, particularly questions 92 
of land readjustment and compensation policy (Samsura, van der Krabben and van Deemen, 93 
2010, 2015).  At one remove, others have shown the utility of using concepts from game theory 94 
to think about the dissemination of information and how this affects the strategies employed by 95 
all those who have any conceivable role in the development process (Kaza and Hopkins, 2009).   96 
The shared underlying logic of research in this vein suggests a fundamentally altered way of 97 
thinking about the economics of land-use planning more widely.   98 
Alternative approaches to thinking about the development process have encompassed the use of 99 
‘big data’ and econometric methods to simulate (aspects of) the production of the built 100 
environment (Brotchie, Sharpe and Toakley, 1973; Gómez-Antonio and Hortas-Rico, 2016; 101 
Jiang, Deng and Seto, 2013; Reades, 2014), systems- and complexity theory-inspired approaches 102 
(Chadwick, 1978; Hillier, de Roo and van Wezemael, 2016) and others that single out variations 103 
in agential power and the chronology of the process as holding explanatory power (Farías and 104 
Bender, 2010; Gar-On Yeh and Wu, 1996; Landis, 1995; Yigitcanlar and Teriman, 2015).  At 105 
the intersection of these contributions sits an array or research which combines insights from 106 
consonant approaches - such as agent-based modelling (ABM), which seeks to marry the impulse 107 
to simulate with an appreciation of human agency (Batty, 2005).  The promise of this approach is 108 
yet to be fully realized as the application of agent-based modelling to the development process is 109 
in its infancy (Baptista et al., 2016; Levy, Martens and van der Heijden, 2016).     110 
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There are exciting developments in, and at the confluence of, all these approaches.  However, 111 
although the various ways of thinking about the development process sketched out above offer 112 
rich insights into the specifics of the development process from place to place we lack a 113 
thoroughgoing epistemological framework that would allow us to make part-whole connections 114 
across the, often, case-based empirical literature.  Indeed, perhaps the single most important 115 
overriding message that emerges from the literature as a whole is that it makes little sense to talk 116 
of the development process when there are such huge variations between contexts: for example, 117 
the discretionary system of the UK, US zoning arrangements and Chinese statutory orchestration 118 
are systemically very distinct with huge variations in both legal framework and norms of practice.  119 
This point is well made in the classic statements of planning as a context-specific activity 120 
comprising multi-agent negotiations (and other communicative acts) (Forester, 1999; Healey, 121 
1997). Therefore, to develop any kind of theoretically nuanced understanding of the 122 
development process that prevails in any particular context means engaging with the human 123 
psychology of decision making.    124 
This presents a very specific challenge in two respects.  Firstly, in theoretical terms we have to be 125 
able to accommodate an understanding that participants in the development process may be 126 
acting on the basis of their beliefs about one another.  By extension these beliefs alone may have 127 
a significant bearing on individual (and collective) action and the outcomes that might result.  128 
Secondly, we need to be able to translate this understanding into empirical investigation.  This 129 
would allow us to develop behavioral insights into the specifics of the ‘planning game’ that plays 130 
out in any particular context. 131 
In this paper we hope to address the first question: how could we theorise counterparty 132 
interaction in the development process to elucidate the importance of the beliefs that each forms 133 
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about the other(s)?  In so doing we hope to make the case that market intervention in the form 134 
of urban and environmental planning could have an effect on how developers think that in turn 135 
shapes how they act.  We argue that this vision of planning as a market actor that regulates 136 
beliefs opens the door to imagining the sorts of planning system that could have a meaningful 137 
impact on business decision making.  To do this we use the medium of a simplified thought 138 
experiment.  This approach has become the principal way of thinking about the underlying 139 
philosophical question – what we can know of other minds – and can be seen in classic examples 140 
such as the ‘brain in a jar’ (see also, Avramides, 2001; Ryle, 1949).  The thought experiment 141 
allows us to explore from first principles under what circumstances we might come to have true, 142 
justified beliefs about cognition, behavior and language in others.  The specific nature of the 143 
thought experiment is a scenario – not always one that must closely mirror reality (as with the 144 
‘brain in a jar’) – that provides a framing device to explore a specific question often pertaining to 145 
a fundamental principle of epistemology, metaphysics, logic or ethics.  Thought experiments 146 
often take a greatly simplified or superficially contrived format to allow us to test the limits of 147 
some imagined state, for example, Hardin’s original iteration of the Tragedy of the Commons (and 148 
developments thereupon) serve perfectly to illustrate this point (Hardin, 1968; Cole, Epstein and 149 
McGinnis, 2014; Feeny et al., 1990).     150 
The medium of the thought experiment is well-aligned to our objectives in this paper as we seek 151 
to explore from first principles the effects of belief on the development process, how beliefs 152 
might affect outcomes and how beliefs might be shaped through regulation.  As established in 153 
the foregoing discussion there cannot be said to be any singular real world with respect to the 154 
development process: there are myriad approaches taken that vary wildly from place to place.  155 
So, our aim is explicitly not to give a fine-grained rendering of how affecting beliefs might alter 156 
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how the development process might work out in any specific location.  We fully acknowledge 157 
that behaviors and the beliefs that motivate them are to some extent a reflection of the rules of 158 
the game established in a particular context.  Instead our aim is to consider the problem in the 159 
abstract through a simplified thought experiment that removes the issue of empirical context. 160 
In what follows we run a thought experiment that follows the well known folk game “Going to 161 
the Party” and in structural terms begins by mirroring the traditional rendering (for example see 162 
Perea, 2012).  The purpose of the thought experiment is to explore how, even in a simplified 163 
scenario involving just two participants, a range of possible outcomes can be imagined dependent 164 
upon what each participant believes regarding the other.  Each outcome is rational and reasonable: a set of 165 
potential ‘states of the world’ (Rasmusen, 2006).  Which set of outcomes is preferable is wholly 166 
normative and would require prescription - an answer to the separate but not unrelated question 167 
of what should be the underpinning goals of a system designed to mediate competing ends vis a vis 168 
how our environment is governed.  It is our contention in this paper that it is the value - and in 169 
the values - of a planning system to appreciate that a range of potential outcomes are possible, that 170 
they are belief-driven and that planning has the agency to seek to manage the beliefs that shape 171 
the process towards one of these end states. 172 
Although we have explicitly and deliberately not sought to develop a thought experiment that 173 
exactly mirrors a specific case from the material world we have started, as with all thought 174 
experiments, from some principles that we are interested in exploring. Firstly, we seek to 175 
investigate how decision makers engaged in the development process might order their 176 
preferences over a range of potential sites; secondly we seek to investigate how these preferences 177 
are affected by beliefs. More specifically, we hope to uncover how, what has long been argued to 178 
be a core, foundational feature of neoliberalism – competition (Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2012, 179 
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2013) - might affect decision making.  In this thought experiment we set out to identify how the 180 
desire to gain an advantage by diminishing competition, a central principle of business strategy 181 
(Porter, 1979; Gunther McGrath, 2013), might play out in the development process where 182 
aversion to competitive rivalry has a clearly spatial dynamic (Bulan, Mayer, Tsuriel Somerville, 183 
2009; Xu and Yeh, 2005).   Building from this we begin with three uncontroversial propositions 184 
that frame the thought experiment:  185 
1.Developers prefer some sites to others. 186 
 187 
2. Developers prefer to limit competition within the context of their spatial preferences 188 
(defined under 1); 189 
 190 
3. Developers will formulate beliefs about one anothers’ spatial preferences that 191 
ultimately affect 1 and 2. 192 
 193 
The thought experiment 194 
Imagine a city that has four vacant sites for redevelopment: A, B, C and D.  A is a ‘prime’ 195 
location; B and C incrementally less desirable and D, a deprived inner city neighbourhood, is 196 
deemed to have the least development potential as a profitable location.  There are two main real 197 
estate developers in our city run, respectively, by Mark and Cecilia.  Mark has a well-defined set 198 
of preferences with respect to the development opportunities in the city: he favours Site A to 199 
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Site B; B to C and C to D; however the situation he dislikes most is when Cecilia competes with 200 
him for a site. 201 
Mark’s preferences can be set out in tabular form: 202 
TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE 203 
The table above simply sets out Mark’s position with respect to how he ranks the desirability of 204 
acquiring each development opportunity; he derives most satisfaction from the acquisition of 205 
Site A and then transitively ranks the following three sites in descending order.  However, a 206 
coincidental choice by Cecilia is the outcome he likes least: when Cecilia chooses to compete 207 
with him the desirability of that site diminishes to zero for Mark.    208 
This ranked order of preferences (4,3,2,1,0) - utilities in the language of economics - represents 209 
Mark’s satisfaction with any of the possible outcomes of site acquisition; the full range of ‘states 210 
of the world’ that might prevail. 211 
All other things being equal it is clear that Mark’s preferred option is Site A.  This is the best 212 
choice for Mark so long as he believes that Cecilia will make any choice other than Site A.  If 213 
Mark believes that Cecilia has similar tastes to himself, and that she will likely pursue Site A too, 214 
the choice of Site B would be rational as the absence of spatial competition means this will yield 215 
a better outcome (expected utility, 3) compared to one where both Mark and Cecilia make the 216 
same choice for Site A (expected utility, 0).   217 
How about Site C?  If Mark believes that Cecilia will choose Site A clearly the only rational 218 
choice for Mark is Site B.  But what if he believes Cecilia has a preference for one of the other 219 
sites?  The strict ordering of the utilities would mean that Mark should go with his strongest 220 
preference, Site A, the one that yields him the greatest utility (4). 221 
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Is it the case, therefore, that there are no circumstances under which Sites C or D could be a 222 
rational choice for Mark? 223 
To this point we have worked solely on the basis that Mark is certain in his belief about what 224 
Cecilia might do.  However, beliefs rarely function in this way.  Instead we might believe to a 225 
certain extent that we can forecast what, for example, a competing property developer might do. 226 
For example, on reflection, Mark might arrive at the belief that he has a 60% expectation that 227 
Cecilia will choose Site A and a 40% probability that she will choose Site B.  If Mark holds this 228 
belief about Cecilia’s actions his expected utility can be summarized as a 60% chance that 229 
following his own strict preferences will result in he and Cecilia competing for the same site (Site 230 
A) the outcome of which would be totally unsatisfactory to Mark (utility, 0) and a 40% chance 231 
that Mark will succeed in obtaining Site A without having to compete with Cecilia (because she 232 
will have gone for Site B) thus realising his most preferred outcome and a utility of 4.  This field 233 
of possibilities produced by Mark’s beliefs could be summarized as: 234 
 235 
Site A: (0.6) 0 + (0.4) 4 = 1.6 236 
 237 
By extension if Mark chooses Site B he expects with probability 0.6 to have avoided competition 238 
with Cecilia and, therefore, to enjoy a utility of 3.  Similarly he anticipates a 40% chance that they 239 
will have both opted for Site B, the presence of competition resulting in an expected utility of 0.  240 
Again, this could be summarized as: 241 
 242 
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Site B: 0.6 (3) + 0.4 (0) = 1.8 243 
 244 
If Mark opts for Site C he expects with certainty that he will not be competing with Cecilia as he 245 
expects with equivalent certainty that she will only be interested in Sites A and B.  Looking again 246 
at Table 1 we see that the expected utility to Mark of choosing Site C is 2: greater than the 247 
expected utility resulting from his beliefs about Cecilia’s preferences with respect to either Site B 248 
(1.8) or Site A (1.6).  Site D is still the least preferred of Mark’s non-competing options with an 249 
expected utility of 1. In summary, Mark now prefers C to B to A to D:  a very different ranking 250 
to the one he started with before we formulated his beliefs as probabilistic expected utilities. We 251 
note that to make the point, we have intentionally kept the analysis as simple as possible. One 252 
may, however, argue that Mark’s belief have been arbitrarily specified without respecting the 253 
strategic interaction between the two players, Mark and Cecilia, and the consistency between 254 
beliefs and actions. To address this point, we demonstrate in the appendix to this paper that 255 
Mark’s belief is consistent with Cecilia’s strategy and is part of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a 256 
game where Mark is uncertain about Cecilia’s preference regarding the four development sites.         257 
Interpretation  258 
This thought experiment illustrates how, even under the terms of a simplified game, rational 259 
choices made by market participants under competition are a function of their beliefs about 260 
others.  It also illustrates how this may result in patterns of behavior that run contra to what one 261 
might expect when beliefs are not considered: in the thought experiment it is Mark’s beliefs 262 
about Cecilia that result in his optimal choice being what would otherwise be his third most 263 
preferred site.   264 
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So what should we make of this more widely?  We can probably imagine scenarios where it may 265 
be in our collective societal interests that developers arrive at the conclusion that their less-266 
preferred sites are the ones that they should pursue.  This may be achieved by encouraging the 267 
necessary belief set on the part of competing developers to allow that conclusion to follow 268 
rationally.  For regulatory planning this would mean helping to install within developers a belief 269 
profile consistent with the conclusion that investing in what would otherwise be their least 270 
preferred sites, often inner city neighbourhoods which have been neglected, would be the logical 271 
thing to do.  This would mean a greater, not lesser, role for planning.  Moreover it would mean a 272 
more economically active position for planning (Adams and Tiesdell, 2010): enhancing the 273 
desirability of C- and D-type sites by creating the perception that the right to develop might be 274 
more readily achieved over sites which, on first principles, would be more desirable to the 275 
developer but where development is less viable, because of competition and/or a diminished 276 
probability of consent.  Alternatively we could potentially conceive of more fundamental ways of 277 
achieving progressive outcomes through planning working with/harnessing neoliberalism’s 278 
competitive impulses.  For example, bundling sites at either end of the spectrum could be 279 
arranged in such a way that the right to develop Site A was accompanied with the obligation to 280 
develop Site D.  Such a strategy would be unequivocally behavioral-economic.  Its outcomes 281 
might also be considered to give more socially preferable outcomes.  Similar observations may be 282 
made with respect to environmentally more, over less, sustainable locations.   283 
In the example in this paper we have simply introduced two competing players, Mark and 284 
Cecilia, without any planning agency to mediate or coordinate their activities.  Such an agency, a 285 
‘market maker’ for land and property, would occupy a strategically vital role. It would be able to 286 
animate markets, shape their conditions and potentially, depending upon its power, reach and the 287 
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skills of those who people it, affect the beliefs and, therefore, the decision making of developers.  288 
For example, in this thought experiment we have not considered what might be entailed if Mark 289 
and Cecilia seek to cooperate and coordinate their actions in some way.  A planning agency that 290 
had the power to diminish the likelihood of this outcome and maintain competitive market 291 
conditions or manipulate them, perhaps through encouraging competition for sites A and B 292 
while diminishing the likelihood of competition for sites C and D, would have a hugely 293 
significant bearing on the perceived desirability of sites.  The corresponding effect such an 294 
agency might have on limiting developers’ choice sets and, critically, developers’ beliefs about 295 
one another’s preferences would also have profound effects on market conditions. Depending 296 
upon the ethical criteria by which such a system is held to account it could potentially privilege 297 
‘better’ outcomes in a neoliberal world in which competition is reified (Campbell, Tait and 298 
Watkins, 2014).   299 
So powerful are beliefs as a determinant of how markets function in practice that the importance 300 
of this role of market making intermediary in creating or installing beliefs can barely be 301 
overstated. If we change the utility profile of Mark’s preferences to make Sites A and B more 302 
strongly favoured than Sites C and D, but leave all other aspects of the thought experiment 303 
unaltered, the implied logical course of action for Mark becomes quite different: 304 
 305 
TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE 306 
 307 
Now, although the strict ranking remains the same, Mark favours Site A quite a bit more strongly 308 
than any other.  Under this revised set of preferences Site C can no longer be an optimal choice 309 
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for Mark.  He prefers Site A sufficiently more strongly that, with the same field of beliefs as 310 
before about Cecilia, his expected utilities become: 311 
Site A: (0.6) 0 + (0.4) 7 = 2.8 312 
Site B: (0.6) 4 + (0.4) 0 = 2.4 313 
The strength of Mark’s preference for Site A now means that despite his belief that Cecilia also 314 
favours this site and his very strong aversion to competition with Cecilia he will favour the 315 
pursuit of this site to the others. 316 
Extension and Conclusions 317 
Although this is only a simplified thought experiment it serves to reveal some significant points 318 
regarding the importance of beliefs in shaping outcomes.  Evidence from behavioral economics 319 
shows that if a belief is widely held and with sufficient conviction we may identify the emergence 320 
of a normalising form of behavior which results in ‘herding’.  This formation of a commonly 321 
held belief extends far beyond the terms of the traditional neoclassical understanding of a wholly 322 
and perennially self-interested economic decision maker.  For example, a connection may be 323 
explicitly traced between social pressures and expert opinion in creating and reinforcing the 324 
instinct to herd (Baddeley, 2013): highly relevant considerations with respect to real estate 325 
transactions where social invocations to ‘get on the property ladder’ and mutually reinforcing 326 
expert opinions abound.  Under conditions such as these the establishment of herding has been 327 
understood as a collective psychological precursor to the irrational escalation of commitment 328 
common to many bubble markets where a premium is assigned to some asset(s) as a function of 329 
the prevailing belief that it is universally understood to be highly-prized (see, for example, 330 
Roberts and Henneberry, 2007 on developers’ potentially irrational preference for capital cities).  331 
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This creation of a socially normalized, limited ‘worldview’ (juxtaposed with the game theory 332 
understanding of multiple possible states of the world) seems to be a tendency common to 333 
humankind (Ostrom, 2014).   334 
More widely it is far from clear that the politically most popular neoclassical analyses of how real 335 
estate markets function can be translated into realisable policy ends.  For example, the view that 336 
building more residential units in areas of extreme demand, such as the New York/tri-state area 337 
or London/South East England will stabilise or lower house prices through reconciling the 338 
mismatch between undersupply and excess(ive) demand is a potentially greatly oversimplified 339 
conclusion (see Marom and Carmon, 2015 for a review of housing policy in these two specific 340 
areas).  The focus on the bricks and mortar of under supply at the expense of the behavioral 341 
psychology of demand in an over-heating market is in keeping with the ceteris paribus assumption 342 
common to neoclassical economics.  But all things are not equal.  Omitting the psychology of 343 
human economic decision makers produces very partial analyses that explain little of the 344 
irrationality of some real estate market outcomes.  Building many more new houses in locations 345 
where demand is strongest may do very little to lower or stabilise prices (assuming this is the true 346 
objective): not if the ‘Site A’ logic for, say, Greater London is sufficiently strong as a prevailing 347 
set of beliefs.  We may simply build a great many very expensive new homes, probably to rather 348 
low standards - “rabbit hutches on postage stamps” (Evans, 1991) - in areas of environmental 349 
jeopardy (in this English context particularly in relation to flood risk) that remain out of reach 350 
for many/most.  From this perspective the answer to resolving the affordable housing situation 351 
may require a fuller engagement with the beliefs and expectations of those who play the 352 
‘planning game’ (Lord, 2012).  353 
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To carry this conclusion through to an alternative policy prescription we can return to the point 354 
at which this paper opened: the status of a planning system.  Although now seemingly friendless 355 
in political circles, planning is perhaps the only viable way of animating real estate markets in 356 
such a way as to challenge or subvert the belief structures that have given rise to one of the most 357 
pressing social problem in many developed countries: urban centres of population where 358 
housing is too expensive for all but the most wealthy.  To illustrate, if we could remake planning 359 
so that its enactment is cognisant of effects on real estate markets we might imagine Mark and 360 
Cecilia playing a different game, one in which planning controls created a ‘state of the world’ 361 
such as this: 362 
 363 
TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE 364 
 365 
To run the thought experiment through to its conclusion if Mark believes that Cecilia has a 50% 366 
probability of choosing Site A, a 30% preference for Site B and favours Site C to a degree of 367 
20%, under this new set of preferences, every possible site becomes a potentially rational choice 368 
for Mark, including the otherwise least-preferred option, Site D.  His expected utilities become: 369 
Site A: (0.5) 10 = 5 370 
Site B: (0.7) 9 = 6.3 371 
Site C: (0.8) 8 = 6.4 372 
Site D: (1) 7 = 7 373 
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The order that Mark began with has been symmetrically reversed.  His optimal choice is to go 374 
for the site he initially favoured least, Site D, because the fear of spatial competition with Cecilia 375 
is now greater relative to a less strongly ordered set of preferences.  Surely this would be the end 376 
goal for any planning system: harnessing the competitive impulses of a neoliberal world to 377 
encourage better outcomes for areas that would otherwise be disadvantaged?  Of course in 378 
practice Mark’s beliefs may moderate over time.  We may need to use Bayesian methods to 379 
understand how he updates his beliefs in light of information he gleans from Cecilia, for 380 
example, if commitment to a course of action is escalated as a result (Gilroy and Hantula, 2016).  381 
Equally Cecilia may use signalling and screening strategies in an attempt to affect Mark’s beliefs 382 
about her.  She may bluff, or double bluff; she may obfuscate; she may dissimulate and 383 
prevaricate.  And so may Mark (see, Benz, Jäger and van Rooij, 2016; Polnaszek and Stephens, 384 
2013).  We invite others to extend and develop the thought experiment such as we have done 385 
here and in the Appendix to this paper.   386 
With so many moving parts, even in this greatly simplified thought experiment, there may be 387 
value in having a referee. An objective and impartial third party who can set and enforce the 388 
rules of the game explicitly to engineer behavioral outcomes may turn out to be a very important 389 
market participant.  This would be particularly true if we are ever to make the Site Ds of the 390 
world – deprived neighbourhoods, complex but environmentally sustainable sites - locations 391 
where developers might rationally choose to invest.  Conceiving of planning in this way suggests 392 
an alternative form of urban and environmental regulation that will entail a fuller dialogue with 393 
behavioral economics and ‘mechanism design’ (for example, Börgers, 2015).  These schools of 394 
thought have had a profound effect on other aspects of public policy (for example, Halpern, 395 
2015; Loewenstein, 2015; Madrian, 2014).  Taking a cue from this literature and thinking again 396 
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about beliefs, values and the epistemic underpinnings of how we animate the markets that 397 
produce the built environment may help us arrive at a clearer view regarding the role and value 398 
of planning in these markets. 399 
 400 
Appendix 401 
Consider a game of incomplete information where Mark and Cecilia independently and 402 
simultaneously choose a development site from the set {A, B, C, D}. If their choices coincide, 403 
they both obtain a payoff of 0. It is known to both players that Mark’s payoffs when choosing A, 404 
B, C, D alone are 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively. However, ex ante there are two possibilities for 405 
Cecilia’s payoffs. With probability 0.6, Cecilia has the same payoffs as Mark’s. With probability 406 
0.4, Cecilia’s payoffs when choosing A, B, C, D alone are 3, 4, 2, and 1, respectively. Note that 407 
Cecilia prefers site B the most in this case. Note also that Cecilia’s payoffs, or in game theoretical 408 
terms types, are Cecilia’s private information while Mark only knows the prior distribution of 409 
Cecilia’s types. The following figure summarizes the game. Intuitively, Cecilia knows which bi-410 
matrix is being played while Mark only knows that the left (type 1 of Cecilia) is being played with 411 
probability 0.6 and the right (type 2 of Cecilia) 0.4.  412 
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 413 
We now claim that the strategy profile {C, (A,B)} constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this 414 
game in which Mark chooses C, and type 1 of Cecilia chooses A and type 2 chooses B. To see 415 
this, note that given Mark’s strategy of choosing C, type 1 of Cecilia indeed maximises her payoff 416 
by selecting A which yields her the highest payoff of 4. On the other hand, type 2 of Cecilia 417 
obtains the highest payoff of 4 by selecting B.   418 
We now show that given Cecilia’s strategy which specifies A and B for type 1 and 2 respectively 419 
Mark finds it optimal to choose C. For Mark, with probability 0.6 the left bi-matrix is being 420 
played where according to Cecilia’s strategy A is chosen, and with probability 0.4 the right bi-421 
matrix is being played where Cecilia selects B. In expected terms, choosing A yields Mark 0.6*0 422 
+ 0.4*4 = 1.6. Similarly, choosing B yields 0.6*3 + 0.4*0 = 1.8. Finally, selecting C yields 0.6*2 + 423 
0.4*2 = 2 and selecting D yields 0.6*1 + 0.4*1 = 1. Thus, Mark indeed maximizes his expected 424 
payoff by selecting C given Cecilia’s equilibrium strategy.   425 
In conclusion, Mark’s belief of Cecilia choosing A with probability 0.6 and B with probability 0.4 426 
is consistent with Cecilia’s best response to Mark’s choice of C. And Mark choosing C is rational 427 
given his belief about Cecilia’s type.      428 
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